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ABSTRACT
Both Black and White voter turnout increases 2-3 percentage points with each Black Democrat on
the ballot. Given the groups' representations in the population, the White response is numerically
greater. Whites of both parties are less likely to vote for their parties' candidate when s/he is Black.
The turnout findings are not explained away by voter, election, or politician characteristics. However
the fact that there is no turnout response to Black Republicans suggests that a perception of Blacks'




37 Hillhouse, Room 2
New Haven, CT 06520
and NBER
ebonya.washington@yale.edu  1 
I. Introduction 
  In 1970 Reverend Andrew Young of Atlanta, Georgia launched a campaign to become 
the first Black Southern congressman since Reconstruction. On the day of the general election, 65 
percent of White registered voters went to the polls to voice their opinions on this issue. 
Statewide, White turnout was only 50 percent. Reverend Young was defeated [Delaney 1970]. 
  Twenty-eight years later in the same state, three Black candidates vied for three separate 
statewide offices. Black turnout soared. Blacks comprised 29 percent of those casting ballots that 
day, up from 16 percent in the previous interim election. Two of three Black candidates won their 
contests [Sack 1998]. 
  These anecdotes suggest a positive impact of Black candidates on the voter turnout of 
two distinct groups: Black voters who come out in support and White voters who come out in 
opposition. Examining the degree to which these anecdotes are borne out in the data is important 
not only for understanding elections which involve Black candidates, but also for interpreting the 
results of any additional contests on the ballot that day. Elections do not occur in isolation. On the 
day that the Atlanta electorate handed Young a defeat, they also helped decide statewide contests 
for governor and lieutenant governor. These contests were likely impacted by the increased 
turnout in response to Young’s candidacy.
1 
This spillover of turnout effects motivates the methodology employed in this paper. The 
vast majority of the voting literature treats each electoral competition as if it were the sole contest 
of the day. In this paper I consider several races in tandem, which is in fact how they occur. I sum 
the total number of Blacks on the ballot, focusing on contests for the United States House of  
Representatives and higher offices. Using this metric and panels of both state and district 
observations for the general election years 1982 to 2000, I find that each Black Democratic 
candidate on the ballot increases district turnout by approximately 2 percentage points. 
Examining impact by race, I find that the increase in Black and White turnout is similar, about 2 
                                                 
1 The winners were Jimmy Carter (governor) and Lester Maddox (lieutenant governor).   2 
to 3 percentage points for each racial group in response to a Black Democratic candidate on the 
ballot. Black Republican candidates, on the other hand, are associated with no such increase in 
the turnout of the aggregate citizenry or of either racial group.  
  Who are the Whites who are responding to a Black Democratic candidate on the ballot? 
They are both Democrats (who increase turnout 7 percentage points) and Republicans (who 
increase their turnout by 5 percentage points). However, party affiliation does not map directly to 
party selected on the ballot. Survey results demonstrate that White voters of both parties are more 
likely to vote against their own party’s candidate when their own party’s candidate is Black.   
The key limitation of this analysis is the endogeneity of Black candidates on the ballot. 
While state fixed effects control for any time-invariant omitted state characteristics, there still 
remains the possibility that the conditional correlation between Black candidates and turnout 
could be due to omitted election, voter, or candidate characteristics that change over time. 
Examining the impact of lags and leads of Black candidates on contemporary turnout, I find no 
evidence that the basic result is caused by some underlying trend in political views. Further, the 
additions of controls for contemporary voter views, voter political knowledge and candidate 
characteristics do not substantively change the point estimate of the impact of Black candidates 
on the voting behavior of White voters.
2 The fact that voters respond to Black Democrats but not 
to Black Republicans, however, does suggest that voters’ perceived polarization between the 
candidates may be part of the reason for increased turnout. Black Democrats are viewed as far 
more liberal than their non-Black counterparts.  
   The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents hypotheses on why 
there may be a link between Black candidates and increased turnout.  Section III provides the data 
and methodology. Section IV details the results and Section V concludes. 
                                                 
2 This analysis is done using the National Election Survey. I do not perform a similar analysis for Black 
voters because the sample size for Blacks is too limited to draw any meaningful conclusions.    3 
II. Why Black Candidates May Raise Turnout 
  Anecdotes aside, there are several reasons why we might observe a conditional 
correlation between Black candidates and voter turnout. The first stems from the theoretical and 
empirical literature that demonstrates that politician ideology can influence policy. (See for 
example Alesina [1988], Wittman [1990] and Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart [2001].) The 
fact that Black employment is higher in cities with Black mayors [Eisenger 1982] and that Black 
legislators receive higher scores on the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Index for their 
voting records [Cameron, Epstein, O’Halloran 1996] suggests that Black politicians may increase 
transfers to Black constituents. However, the possibilities of omitted constituency characteristics 
driving these results mean that they cannot be interpreted in a causal manner. In other countries 
the reservation of leadership positions for members of particular ethnic groups allows for the 
identification of the impact of politician race on transfers to constituents of various racial groups. 
For example, Pande [2003] exploits the reservation of village leadership positions in India for 
members of particular tribes and castes, to demonstrate that leaders increase transfers to members 
of their own ethnic group. Unfortunately, due to the lack of exogenous variation in leadership 
ethnicity we have no conclusive evidence for the United States. 
  Secondly, whether or not voters believe that the race of the elected official impacts the 
distribution of resources, Black candidates may increase turnout simply due to voter preferences 
for representation by a person of one’s own race. Previous lab work manipulating candidate 
descriptions and race provides mixed evidence on Whites preferences for Black candidates over 
otherwise identical White candidates. (See Terkildsen [1993] and Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, 
and Nitz [1995].)  
  Thirdly, Black candidates may raise turnout owing to a lack of information on the part of 
voters. In low-information elections voters rely on cues such as candidate party, incumbency 
status, race and gender to determine candidate position. Employing candidate descriptions that 
randomly vary by race, McDermott [1998] shows that respondents view Black candidates as   4 
being more liberal than identically described White candidates. Seeing a Black Democratic 
candidate on the ballot, voters may infer that there is a great ideological distance between the 
Democratic and Republican candidates and hence much at stake. Ideally one would test this 
hypothesis by examining whether increased turnout can be “explained away” by candidate 
ideology and/or perceived candidate ideology. Unfortunately, such a metric is not available. 
Therefore I rely on three more crude tests. First, I compare voter turnout in the face of Black 
Democratic candidates and Black Republican candidates. Secondly, I simply control for voter 
perception of party ideology during the time of the election. Thirdly, I compare voter turnout in 
the face of incumbent Black candidates (for whom voters should presumably have information on 
ideology) and non-incumbent Black candidates. I shed additional light on the lack of information 
story by focusing in some specifications solely on senatorial elections, where voters arguably 
have more information than in elections for the House of Representatives. 
  Finally, the Black candidate voter turnout link may simply be due to omitted time variant 
characteristics of elections, voters or candidates. Therefore I examine the robustness of the basic 
result to the addition of controls for contemporary voter views, voter political knowledge and 
candidate characteristics. 
  I present these results in detail, after describing the data and methodology in the next 
section. 
III. Data and Methodology 
  I combine data on the race/ethnicity of House, Senate and gubernatorial candidates with 
voter turnout data from both official election results and from surveys of voting age individuals. 
III.A. Candidate Data 
  Data on the name, state, district, party, office sought, incumbency status and votes 
received for all congressional and gubernatorial candidates, 1982-2000 were generously provided   5 
by James Snyder.
3 I limit attention to major party (Democratic or Republican) candidates seeking 
office in general elections occurring in even numbered years. General elections for House of 
Representatives, Senate and 45/50 governorships occur in even years.
4 I rely on various issues of 
Focus Magazine
5 as well as the Associated Press Candidate Biographies
6,7 to code the 
race/ethnicity of the remaining 9,253 candidate observations. I then collapse the data to electoral 
contest/year cells.  
Table I summarizes these data. During the time frame of the study, Black candidates were 
most present in House elections, 9 percent of which featured at least one Black candidate. That 
figure is 4 percent for the Senate and less than 2 percent for gubernatorial races. In 14 percent of 
House elections that include Black candidates, a single Black candidate runs unopposed. Black 
candidates never run unopposed for Senate or governor. In contested House elections, a Black 
candidate meets another Black candidate 29 percent of the time. A Black candidate never meets a 
Black candidate in a Senate or gubernatorial election in this time period. Finally Table I shows 
that in contested elections with a single Black candidate, the Black candidate is more likely to be 
the Democrat: 74 percent of the time in the House, 58 percent of the time in the Senate, and 75 
percent of the time for the Governor’s mansion. 
III.B. District Official Turnout Data 
                                                 
3 These data are partially available as Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Study 
Number 7757. 
4 The timing of the gubernatorial races has changed in some states across time. Currently Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia hold elections in odd years.  
5 Available on the website of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies.  
6 Available on Lexis-Nexis. 
7 When these sources failed to identify race, I consulted newspaper articles and Internet resources. Two 
particularly helpful sites were www.politicalgraveyard.com which lists the race of many candidates and the 
CNN politics website which includes photographs of candidates. For 1.3 percent of candidates, 
biographical information contained no definitive identification of race. These candidates were coded White. 
Therefore it is possible that this analysis undercounts Black candidates. In the case of four candidates of 
unknown race who oppose Black candidates, analyses were re-run coding these candidates as Black. 
Results are robust to this change.   6 
  Using the total votes received by House candidates to proxy total district turnout,
8 I use 
the candidate race data to run equations of the following form:   
 (1) Ydt = a + b1TBDdt + b2TBRdt + b3SENst + b4GOVst + b5SINCRUNst + b6GINCRUNst + 
b7HINCRUNst + ht + gdt + edt, 
where d indexes districts, s states and t time. Y is the share of voting eligibles who turn out to 
vote.
9 TBD and TBR are the key independent variables: the total number of contested elections 
(of the House, Senate and gubernatorial elections) that include Black Democratic (Republican) 
candidates running against non-Black candidates. The maximum possible value for TBD, TDR 
and the sum of the two variables is 3. SEN and GOV are dummies for senatorial and 
gubernatorial races. (House elections take place in every election year; presidential elections are 
captured by the year effects.)  SINCRUN, GINCRUN and HINCRUN are dummies indicating 
whether an incumbent is running for Senate, governor or House, respectively.
10 I allow for year to 
year variation in national voting trends by including year effects (ht). Additionally, I control for 
district characteristics by including district*redistricting period fixed effects (gdt).  The number of 
Blacks on the ballot in a state is likely correlated across time. To adjust for this lack of 
independence, I cluster the standard errors at the state level as prescribed by Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan [2004]. 
  The limitation of official turnout data is the lack of voter demographics. To examine 
turnout effects by race and party, I must rely on surveys which only allow for state level analyses. 
                                                 
8 Data are normalized using census population data. Given that roll off—abstaining from casting a vote in a 
particular contest on the ballot—typically does not occur in higher level, more publicized elections 
[Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002] the House votes should well approximate turnout. However, this may not be 
the case when the House election is uncontested thereby giving voters no incentive to mark the ballot for 
this contest. For this reason I control for whether the House election is contested. Further I perform the 
analysis with and without the district/years with uncontested House elections. Results do not vary 
substantively.  
9 I define a person as voting eligible if s/he is a citizen who is at least 18 years of age. 
10 The expected closeness of each election may also impact turnout. In robustness checks, I include ex-post 
closeness of the various contests on the ballot as an additional covariate. The basic pattern of results is 
unchanged. In tables I present results without the closeness variables because of their potential 
endogeneity.   7 
Before turning to these surveys, I demonstrate that the relationship between Black candidates and 
turnout holds at the state level more general. 
III.C. State Official Turnout Data 
  Data on state level turnout
11 are merged with the candidate race data to run regressions of 
the form: 
(2) Yst = a + b1TBDst + b2TBRst +b3SENst + b4GOVst + b5SINCRUNst + b6GINCRUNst + 
b7HINCRUNst + ht + gs + est, 
where TBD
12 is now defined as  
 (3)  ) 1 GBD ( ) 1 SBD (
N
) 1 HBD (






and n indexes congressional districts in a state/year. N is the total number of districts in the 
state/year. HBD is an indicator for whether the House election includes a Black Democratic 
candidate running against a non-Black. SBD and GBD are the analogous variables for the state 
level elections. The remaining variables in Equation 2 are defined as in Equation 1 with the 
exception of HINCRUN which is now the proportion of House elections involving an incumbent. 
gs is now a vector of state fixed effects. Cells are weighted by number of districts in the state. 
Standard errors continue to be clustered at the state level. 
III.D. Current Population Survey Data 
  The limitation of official turnout data at any level of aggregation is the lack of 
demographic information on those turning out. To examine results by race and party I turn to two 
surveys of voting age Americans. The first is the Current Population Survey (CPS), fielded to 
approximately 100,000 citizens age 18 or older in November of even years. In addition to 
whether or not they voted, respondents are asked for demographic information including 
                                                 
11 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Study Number 1248. 
12 TBR is defined analogously.   8 
education, employment status, age, income, gender, marital status, state of residence (but not 
district) and race. (See Appendix I for survey data sample means.) 
  By combining candidate race/ethnicity data with CPS data collapsed to the state/year 
level I can run regressions of the form: 
(4) Yst = a + b1TBDst + b2TBRst  b3SENst + b4GOVst + b5SINCRUNst + b6GINCRUNst + 
b7HINCRUNst + Xst + ht + gs + est, 
where variables are defined as in Equation 2. X is a vector of demographic characteristics.
13 
Regressions are now run separately by racial groups. Cells continue to be weighted by the number 
of districts in the state to examine the impact of Black candidates on turnout in the average 
district. Standard errors continue to be clustered at the state level. 
III.E. National Election Studies Data 
  While the CPS includes some demographic data, it does not contain information on 
respondents’ political views or leanings nor on the respondents’ experiences during the electoral 
season. In order to examine the impact of Black candidates on respondents of different political 
leanings, I turn to the National Election Studies (NES), a biennial survey of United States’ 
residents of voting age. The major limitation of the NES is its small sample size—only one to two 
thousand respondents per survey year—with no oversampling of Black Americans. Because of 
the limited sample size, specifications focusing on Blacks prove uninformative.
14 Being unable to 
look at Black voting behavior by party is not a great handicap given that in partisan elections, 70 
to 90 percent of the time, Black Americans cast their votes in favor of the Democratic candidate 
[McDermott 1998]. The small sample size of the NES also renders district level (rather than state 
level) analyses uninformative.
15 Hence I continue to run regressions of the form of Equation 4 
using these data. The NES does allow for an examination of the impact of Black candidates on 
                                                 
13 Demographic characteristics are drawn from the November CPS. 
14 For this reason I use CPS data on percent Black and percent White in the population in the NES analyses. 
The remaining demographics are drawn from the NES.  
15 I can not even fill all of my White state cells using the NES where the number of White state/year cells 
falls to 340 from 500 in the CPS.   9 
White voters, by voter party. Furthermore, the expanded political information allows for a variety 
of robustness checks to examine whether the Black candidate White voter turnout connection is 
explained by political views or election characteristics. 
Finally, because the NES contacts respondents’ election offices to verify their reported 
voting behavior, I can use the NES to demonstrate that overreporting, always a concern in voting 
surveys
16 does not appear to be driving the results of the next section: While White candidates are 
significantly more prone to falsely indicate that they have voted when there is a Black Republican 
on the ballot, the same is not true when faced with a Black Democratic candidate. My results 
indicate that only Black Democratic candidates are associated with increased voter turnout. Black 
voters show no significant correlation between false indications of having voted and race of the 
candidate on the ballot.
17  (See Appendix II for this analysis.) 
IV. Results 
IV.A. Total Turnout 
Lublin and Tate [1995] show that turnout in mayoral elections is higher when there is a 
Black candidate on the ballot. In Table II, I demonstrate that Black candidates in higher level 
elections are also associated with increased turnout. In the top panel, I amend Equations 1, 2 and 
4 to combine my independent variables of interest into a single variable summing all Blacks (of 
either party) running against non-Blacks. The first column of the table reflects district level 
results where each Black candidate on the ballot is associated with approximately a 1 percentage 
point increase in aggregate turnout. Given the need to aggregate to the state level for subsequent 
analyses, the next two columns investigate the extent to which the presence of Black candidates 
in other districts alters the column 1 finding. I add (column 2) to the basic specification an 
indicator for whether there is a Black running in a House election in another district in the state. 
                                                 
16 See for example Silver, Anderson, and Abramson [1986]. 
17 While the CPS offers no voter verification study, Teixera [1992] shows that aggregate voter turnout rates 
implied by these micro data are close to true voter turnout. Further the fact that White results are similar 
across the two datasets suggests that overreporting bias is not a problem in the CPS.    10 
In column 3 the second independent variable of interest is the proportion of other districts in the 
state in which there is a Black candidate running for House. Neither measure of Black candidates 
in outside districts changes the coefficient on within district total Blacks. Clearly, voters are 
moved to the polls by Black candidates in their own districts. Point estimates indicate that they 
are also so moved by Black candidates in other districts. However, the effect is only significant 
when modeled as an indicator for other Blacks rather than as the proportion of other districts with 
Black candidates on the ballot. So while I cannot conclusively resolve the issue of whether Black 
candidates in district one increase turnout in district two, what is clear from Table II is that Black 
candidates in district one increase turnout in district one. This is crucial to keep in mind as we 
move to state level analyses. 
  The remaining columns of Table II demonstrate the robustness of the result when data are 
aggregated to the state level. Column 4 presents the results from a regression of the form of 
Equation 2. Black candidates are once again associated with a significant increase in total turnout, 
this time of 1.9 percentage points. Moving from official turnout data to survey data Black 
candidates continue to be associated with a 1-2 percentage point increase in aggregate turnout. 
However the result is imprecisely estimated in both the CPS and the NES. 
  The bottom panel of Table II investigates the extent to which the increased turnout is 
driven by Black candidates of each of the major parties. Column 1 continues to focus on the 
district level where we see that each Black Democratic candidate is associated with a 1.6 
percentage point increase in voter turnout. Black Republican candidates appear to somewhat 
decrease turnout but that result is not significant. And as in panel A the district level result is 
robust to controls for Black candidates on the ballot in other districts within the same state. (See 
columns 2 and 3.) 
  Moving to state level data, the story remains the same. Black Democratic candidates 
drive the increased turnout. Both the returns data and the CPS show a significant increase in 
turnout (of 3.2 and 2.1 percentage points respectively) for each Black Democratic candidate on   11 
the ballot. Both data sources also show an insignificant decrease in turnout associated with each 
Republican candidate. While neither Republican nor Democratic candidates produce significant 
increases in turnout in the NES, point estimates are twice as large for Black Democrats as for 
Black Republicans using that dataset. Black Democratic candidates in higher level elections are 
associated with an increase in voter turnout. 
  However, Black Republican candidates do not appear to have the same impact. This is 
potentially for two reasons. The first potential reason for Black Republicans’ failure to increase 
turnout in the same manner as their Democratic counterparts is that Black Republican candidates 
have historically been less viable. From 1982 to 2000, in House elections, Black Democratic 
candidates won 88 percent of their elections while Black Republicans succeeded only 4 percent of 
the time. In the Senate Black Democrats were victorious 14 percent of the time and Black 
Republicans never. So perhaps based on history voters do not take Black Republican candidates 
as seriously. 
  A second potential reason for the differential impact of Black Democrats and Black 
Republicans on turnout concerns polarization. Once in office, Black legislators are more liberal 
than the average non-Black legislator, even controlling for party, according to rating scores 
tabulated by organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action Committee and the 
American Conservative Union. Given that Democrats are rated far more liberally than 
Republicans, it is likely that when voters observe a Black Democrat running against a non-Black 
Republican they expect greater polarization between the two candidates than when they observe a 
Black Republican pitted against a non-Black Democrat. In Section IV.D, I investigate the extent 
to which party polarization can explain the increased turnout.  
IV.B. Turnout by Voter Race 
Which voters are increasing their ranks at the polls when there is a Black candidate on the 
ballot? Table III looks at that question by racial group. Results from a model of Equation 4 using 
CPS state level data indicate that each Black Democratic candidate is associated with a significant   12 
2.3 percentage point increase in Black voter turnout (column 1) and a 2.2 percentage point 
increase in White voter turnout (column 2).
18 The Black Republican candidate results continue to 
be insignificant and in the case of White voters, negative. Given that Blacks and Whites comprise 
10 and 82 percent, respectively, of the population in the average district, the numerical increase in 
White voters is about 8 times that of Black voters. Considering the magnitude with respect to the 
average district in which there is a Black candidate running, the White increase is still 1.7 times 
larger than that of Blacks.
19,20 
  Results for Whites are robust to a change in dataset. The NES data show an increase of 
4.1 percentage points (column 4) for each Black Democratic candidate on the ballot. The NES 
results for Black voters (column 3), however, are uninformative as the standard error on the 
variable of interest grows by more than 6 times. This growth is no doubt due to the small sample 
and cell sizes for the NES state level Black sample.  
IV.C. Turnout by Party  
Table III demonstrates a significant conditional correlation between Black Democratic 
candidates and increased Black and White voters’ turnout. We know that the Blacks are most 
likely voting Democratic or in favor of the Black candidate [McDermott 1998]. The political 
leanings of the Whites motivated to the polls by the presence of a Black on the ballot are 
examined in Table IV.  
  The differential impact of Black candidates on turnout by party is examined by collapsing 
NES data to state/year/party cells and by expanding Equation 4 to include party dummies
21 and 
                                                 
18 The sample size differs slightly between the first two columns because there are 10 state/years in which 
the CPS sampled no Blacks. 
19 During the time period, the average district with positive total Blacks on the ballot is 33 percent Black 
and 59 percent White.  
20 Black candidates are more likely to run in districts with larger percentages of Black residents. Thus the 
average number of Black candidates in a state is an overestimate of the average White resident’s exposure 
to Black candidates and an underestimate of the average Black resident’s exposure. Recalculating the Black 
candidate variables to allow for weighting of House candidates by the proportion of the state’s Black (or 
White) population yields CPS point estimates on Black Democratic candidates of .014 and .023 for Black 
and White voters respectively.  
21 About 1/3 of White voters in the NES identify as Democrat, 1/3 as Republican and 1/3 as Independent.    13 
the interactions of the party variables with Black Democratic candidates on the ballot.
22 (Party is 
self-identified by respondents.) The results, presented in column 1 of Table IV, indicate that 
White Republicans increase turnout by a significant 5.2 percentage points when faced with a 
Black Democrat on the ballot. The increase amongst White Democrats—7.1 percentage points—
is even larger and provides evidence to the contrary of previous findings that White Democrats 
abstain when faced with a Black Democratic candidate on the ballot. (See for example [Bositis 
1998].) Independents show an insignificant decrease in turnout with each additional Black 
Democratic candidate on the ballot. 
  The column 1 results suggest that if White voters cast ballots along party lines then the 
increased turnout that Black Democrats draw is more greatly in support of their candidacies than 
against. However, as the remaining columns of the table indicate, White voters are less likely to 
support their party’s candidate if that candidate is Black. The dependent variables in the vote 
choice analysis (columns 2 through 4) are drawn from questions that ask respondents shortly after 
the election to name the parties of the candidates that they chose for House, Senate and governor. 
The measure may be an overestimate of White voting for Black candidates as there is evidence 
that White voters are reluctant to tell surveyors that they are voting against Black candidates.
23 
However the fact that there is no mention of race (or of candidate’s names) may mitigate this 
reluctance. 
  I continue to collapse data to state/year/party cells limiting the analysis only to contested 
electoral contests and only to individuals who report casting ballots for major party candidates. I 
expand the model of Equation 4 to include interactions of both the Black Democratic and Black 
                                                 
22 The Black Republican candidates variable is eliminated in this model. Its elimination has no substantive 
impact on the estimation of the remaining coefficients. 
23 In 1982 when White Republican George Deukmejian ran against Black Democrat Tom Bradley for 
governor of California, Deukmejian’s campaign manager said to a group of journalists, “If we are down 
only five points or less in the polls by election time, we’re going to win. It’s just a fact of life. If people are 
going to vote that way, they certainly are not going to announce it for a survey taker.” The campaign 
manager was proved correct. Although exit interviews suggested that Bradley was “well ahead,”George 
Deukmejian won the election [Pettigrew and Alston 1988].   14 
Republican variables with the party of the White voter. A dummy for a vote for the Democratic 
candidate is used as the dependent variable. 
  White voters of all parties are significantly less likely to vote for the Democratic House 
candidate if that candidate is Black, say the results of column 2. While significant for voters of all 
parties, the effect is largest for Democratic voters, followed by Independents and then finally 
Republicans. There is no systematic relationship between Black Republican House candidates 
and voter choice in House elections.  
  For Senatorial elections (column 3), where unfortunately there is much less variation in 
candidate race, it is Republicans who are less likely to vote for their party’s candidate when that 
candidate is Black. Independents and Republicans are 28 and 25 percentage points more likely, 
respectively, to vote for the Democratic candidate when the Republican candidate is Black. 
  And finally column 4 shows that both Democrats and Republicans are less likely to vote 
for their party’s gubernatorial candidate if that candidate is Black. White Democrats are 20 
percentage points less likely to vote for the Democratic candidate when s/he is Black. 
Symmetrically, White Republicans are 18 percentage points more likely to vote for the 
Democratic candidate when his/her opponent is Black. However, the small number of Black 
gubernatorial candidates in the sample means that this final analysis is suggestive at best. 
Nonetheless taken collectively the results of the vote choice analyses of columns 2 through 4 
provide evidence that White voters’ likelihood of voting for a candidate decreases when that 
candidate is Black. 
IV.D. Explanations for Increased Turnout 
To review, the basic result is that each Black Democratic candidate on the ballot is 
associated with an increase in both Black and White voter turnout of about 2 percentage points. 
The additional Whites who come to the polls when there is a Black Democrat on the ballot 
represent both of the major parties. However, White voters, again of both parties, show a 
decreased likelihood of voting for a major party candidate if that candidate is Black. But clearly   15 
Black candidates are not distributed randomly throughout elections. We can not conclude that 
Black candidates cause an increase in voter turnout. This section focuses on explaining the Black 
candidate increased voter turnout link. 
Because the methodology of this paper is an examination of differences-in-differences, 
fixed differences in state tastes for Black representation cannot explain the findings. However one 
potential explanation is that the results reflect concurrent trends in voting behavior and Blacks’ 
seeking higher offices. Figure I demonstrates that this is not the case. The figure graphs the 
coefficients from a regression of Black (White) voter turnout on total Black Democrats on the 
ballot for five election cycles, from a two-election lead to a two-election lag.
24 Results for White 
voters are indicated by a dashed line. For White voters the evidence is quite compelling. Both 
lags and both leads show a small negative association between Black candidates and White 
turnout. There is a spike to a 3.4 percentage point increase in turnout in the contemporary period. 
For Black voters the evidence is less stark, but still refutes a simple trend explanation. In the pre-
period the turnout response is negative and fairly flat before jumping to 2.4 percentage points in 
the contemporary period. One election cycle after the Black candidate appears on the ballot 
turnout is still somewhat elevated (1 percentage point)
25 before falling to zero on the second 
election cycle after the Black candidate runs.  
While trends do not explain the basic results, there still remains the possibility of an 
omitted correlate of turnout and Black candidates driving the findings. Omitted variables related 
to voter attitudes, election characteristics or candidate characteristics could potentially be biasing 
results. Table V examines the robustness of turnout results to the inclusion of such variables. 
Because the additional variables are drawn from the NES, Table V only examines the robustness 
of the White turnout results. The table is divided horizontally into two panels. The bottom panel 
(panel B) shows the robustness checks. Coefficients for both the Black Democratic candidate 
                                                 
24 The figure includes the years 1982-1996. 
25 The increased turnout one election cycle later could be interpreted as evidence in support of the Gerber, 
Green, and Shacar [2003] contention that voting is habit forming.    16 
variables and the potential omitted variable are shown. The sample size in Table V varies from 
column to column for two reasons: 1) The NES does not ask all questions in all years and 2) Not 
all respondents answer all questions. So for comparison, each cell in panel A provides the Black 
Democratic coefficient from a basic regression using the same sample as the robustness check 
below it.  
One possibility is that the increased White turnout is explained by voter attitudes: either 
attitudes toward Blacks or Whites’ own personal placement on the liberal/conservative spectrum. 
For example, a racial incident in an area could increase White voters’ animosity toward Blacks, 
Blacks’ propensity to run for office and the likelihood that voters of both races will head to the 
polls. However, the inclusion of such attitudes in columns 1 and 2 do not serve to substantially 
mitigate the Black Democrat coefficient. The attitude toward Blacks variable serves to decrease 
the Black Democrat coefficient by only 15 percent; the conservatism scale variable leaves the 
coefficient unchanged to the third decimal place. 
Alternatively the increased turnout could be explained by an increase in knowledge or 
focus on the election. Perhaps the press gives more attention to Black candidates, particularly if 
the candidate would be the first Black to hold the particular office in the area. I examine this 
possibility by adding to the basic specification controls for 1) being contacted by a political party 
regarding the election; 2) being contacted by any organization regarding the election; 3) attending 
to media regarding the election; and 4) ability to recall at least one of the House candidate’s in 
one’s district. As shown in columns 3 to 6, all four of these measures of political information 
have a positive conditional correlation with voter turnout. The media and recall variables are 
significant predictors of voting. However none of these measures explains away the conditional 
correlation between Black candidates and White turnout. In fact all serve to slightly increase the 
magnitude of the Black candidate coefficient.  
In the final column of Table V, I begin to examine how candidate characteristics—or in 
this case voters’ perceptions of candidate characteristics—affect the Black candidate increased   17 
turnout link. Black candidates are viewed by potential voters as being more liberal than 
identically described White candidates [McDermott 1998]. There is some basis for this belief as 
Black legislators are more liberal than the average non-Black legislator, even controlling for 
party, according to rating scores tabulated by organizations such as the Americans for Democratic 
Action Committee and the American Conservative Union. Thus when voters confront a Black 
Democratic candidate on their ballots they may believe that the ideological distance between the 
two major party candidates is greater than if the Democrats were fielding a non-Black. Thus 
voters may perceive a greater need to come out to vote because there is more at stake. The fact 
that a Black Republican candidate would not serve to increase such polarization may explain why 
Black Democratic, but not Republican, candidates increase turnout. While the NES does not ask 
respondents how liberal they believe House, Senate and gubernatorial candidates are, the study 
does ask respondents to rank each of the major parties on a liberal conservative scale from 1 to 7. 
Assuming that present day candidates would be factored into a respondent’s assessment of the 
positioning of a major party, I construct a measure of perceived party polarization by taking the 
absolute value of the difference of a respondent’s liberal/conservative rating of the two parties. 
The final column of Table V indicates that this variable is positively and significantly related to 
turnout. However, the inclusion of this indicator serves to mitigate the Black Democratic 
coefficient by only 12 percent. A difference—like the differences for the previous six 
specification checks—that is not statistically significant.
26 Admittedly, however, the polarization 
variable is quite crude. It is possible that a more precise measure of polarization could partially 
explain the conditional correlation between Black candidates and voter turnout.  
In Table VI, I examine how the inclusion of other candidate characteristics into the model 
of Equation 4 impacts findings. Because these additional candidate characteristics are drawn from 
                                                 
26 In fact, controlling for the four potentially omitted variables that are missing for no more than one/state 
year of the 340 in which in which the NES surveyed Whites between 1982 and 2000, increases the Black 
Democratic coefficient from .041(.023) for the basic specification to .046(.024) for the robustness check 
specification.    18 
the Associated Press Candidate Biographies and not from the NES, the specifications in Table VI 
make use of CPS data so that results for both Black and White voters may be shown.  
The first candidate characteristic examined is incumbency status. In column 1 I run 
models of the form of Equation 4 in which I decompose the variables of interest into Black 
Democratic incumbents and non-incumbents. I do the same for Black Republican candidates. To 
differentiate general inexperience with Black representation from inexperience with a particular 
Black candidate, I further control for the years, since Reconstruction, that the state has been 
represented by Blacks in the Senate, governor’s mansion and House of Representatives.
27,28 The 
results of column 1 show that while point estimates indicate that Blacks’ turnout response is 
larger when there is an incumbent on the ballot as opposed to a non-incumbent (of either party) 
the differences are not statistically significant. However, column 5 results indicate that White 
voters respond differently to Black Democratic candidates depending on incumbency status. 
While White voters show a significant 3.1 percentage point increase for every Black Democratic 
non-incumbent on the ballot, they show a 3.4 percentage point decrease for each Black 
Democratic incumbent. The difference is statistically significant. There is not a statistically 
significant difference in White voters’ response to Black Republican incumbents compared with 
Black Republican non-incumbents. These results suggest that if White voters are motivated to 
polls, even in part, by Black candidates’ liberalness, this impetus seems to wear off once the 
candidate assumes office.  However, these results are not robust to a change in dataset. In NES 
data, White voters show a significant larger positive turnout response to Black Democratic 
incumbents than to Black Democratic non-incumbents.  
In the specifications of Columns 1 and 4 incumbency status may simply proxy for 
experience. In the final columns of Table VI, I investigate this possibility. These columns focus 
                                                 
27 Years of House representation by Blacks is normalized by the number of districts in the state in the 
current period. 
28 The years of service of Black Members of Congress are drawn from Amer [2001]. The years of service 
of Black governors come from the website of the National Governors Association (www.nga.com).   19 
entirely on Senate elections from 1988 to 2000. Such a focus was chosen because biographical 
information on more recent candidates is more readily available.
29 Further information on those 
running for Senate is also more available than on those running for House. The limitation of this 
focus is of course, the small number of Black candidates
30 used to identify the coefficient of 
interest.  
Each Black Democratic senatorial candidate is associated with an increase in Black 
turnout of 2.9 percentage points (column 2) and in White turnout (column 6) of 4 percentage 
points. Only the White turnout response is significant. Black Republicans running for Senate have 
no impact on turnout of either Black or White voters. The remaining columns of the table 
examine how experience mitigates this relationship. In columns 3 and 7 the state level 
(gubernatorial or senatorial) experience of the candidates is controlled for. This addition does not 
change the relationship between Black senatorial candidates and either Black or White turnout 
substantially. In columns 4 and 8 controls for candidate House experience, education and military 
service are further added to the specification. Once again, results are robust to the additions. 
Further the results for Whites are robust to a change in dataset to the NES. If incumbency does in 
fact serve to mitigate the relationship between Black candidates and White turnout it is not due to 
a general experience effect. Rather if there is a differential impact of Black incumbents and non-
incumbents the differential seems to be due to the specific experience of having held the 
particular position.  
V. Conclusion 
There is much anecdotal evidence that Black candidates increase voter turnout. In some 
stories, Black Americans come to the polls in support. In others White Americans come out in 
opposition. I quantify the impact of Black candidates seeking election to the House of 
Representatives and higher offices. Black voter turnout increases by 2.3 percentage points for 
                                                 
29 The year restriction only eliminates one senatorial contest that includes a Black candidate. 
30 There are eleven Blacks senatorial candidates, seven of whom are Democrats, during the time period.   20 
every Black Democrat on the ballot. White voter turnout increases by 2.2 percentage points, an 
increase that is numerically greater given the relative numbers of Whites and Blacks in the 
average district. The Whites who are propelled to the polls come from the ranks of both 
Democrats and Republicans. However both White Democrats and White Republicans have a 
reduced likelihood of voting for a major party candidate when that candidate is Black.  
What explains this increased turnout? Candidate experience does not. Nor do voter 
attitudes. Nor does increased media, party or voter attention.  Perhaps a perception of an extreme 
liberalness on the part of Black candidates is a factor. This is consistent with the increased turnout 
in response to Black Democratic but not Black Republican candidates. To further test this validity 
of this explanation, data on candidate ideology and on voters’ perception thereof are needed. The 
collection and analysis of such data is the subject of future work.  
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APPENDIX I: CPS AND NES MEANS, BY RACE CELLS 
 
  Blacks  Whites 
Variable  CPS  NES  CPS  NES 
Percent voting  .55  .54  .61  .63 
         
Percent married  .46  .31  .66  .57 
         
Elementary  .10  .09  .07  .06 
Some high school  .21  .15  .14  .10 
High school  .33  .34  .34  .32 
Some college  .24  .29  .24  .25 
College  .11  .13  .21  .27 
         
Family income ( in thousands of 2000 dollars)  30.3  35.0  44.8  49.2 
         
Percent unemployed  .07  .08  .03  .03 
         
Percent Black   .10  .11  .10  .10 
Percent White  .82  .81  .82  .82 
         
Total Blacks running in contested elections 
against non-Blacks 
.11  .12  .11  .12 
Total Black Democrats running in contested 
elections against non-Blacks 
.08  .09  .08  .09 
Total Black  Republicans running in contested 
elections against non-Blacks 
.03  .03  .03  .03 
         
Number of state years  490/500  241/500  500/500  340/500 
State/year cells are weighted by number of districts. Data are from the NES and CPS November 
files, 1982-2000. 




APPENDIX II: IMPACT OF BLACK CANDIDATES ON VOTER OVERREPORTING, NES 
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N  517  4050 
Analyses cover the years 1984 to 1990, when the NES conducted voter verification surveys. 
Specifications include election characteristics and age, state and year dummies.  Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the state level. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level and * at the 10 percent level.    
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TABLE I 
NUMBER OF BLACK CANDIDATES BY ELECTION TYPE, 1982-2000 (EVEN YEARS ONLY) 
 
Type of electoral contest  Number of 
such 
contests 
House of Representatives   
(total N=435 districts*10 years) = 4350 elections   
Number of races with Black candidates  389 
Number of contested races w/ Black candidate  335 
Number of contested races w/ one Black candidate  239 
Number of contested races w/one Black candidate who is a Republican  61 
   
Senate   
(total N=333)   
Number of races w/Black candidate  12 
Number of races w/one Black candidate  12 
Number of races w/one Black candidate who is a Republican  5 
   
Governor   
(total N=239)   
Number of races w/Black candidate  4 
Number of races w/ one Black candidate  4 
Number of races w/one Black candidate who is a Republican  1 
All Senate and gubernatorial elections involving Black candidates are contested.   26 
 
TABLE II 
IMPACT OF BLACK CANDIDATES ON VOTER TURNOUT 
 
  District level analysis  State level analysis 
  Returns data  Returns data  Returns data  Returns data  CPS  NES 
Panel A             
Total Blacks running in contested 













Indicator for a Black candidate in another 
district in the state 
  .013*** 
(.004) 
       
Proportion of other districts in state with 
Black candidates 
    .015 
(.022) 
     
             
Panel B             
Total Black Democrats running in 














Total Black  Republicans running in 














Indicator for a Black candidate in another 
district in the state 




     
Proportion of other districts in state with 
Black candidates 
           












Analyses include general elections years 1982-2000. Column 4 excludes Louisiana 1982. All specifications include controls for electoral contests on the ballot, 
incumbents seeking reelection and year dummies. District level analyses further include House race contested and district*redistricting period dummies. State level 
analyses include state dummies as well as controls for percent married, percent unemployed, percent Black and percent White as well as education and income 
level controls. CPS demographics are used with the returns data in column 4. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 
percent level.    27 
TABLE III 
IMPACT OF BLACK CANDIDATES ON STATE VOTER TURNOUT, BY VOTER RACE 
 
  CPS  CPS  NES  NES 
  Black turnout  White turnout  Black turnout  White turnout 
Total Black Democrats running in 










         
Total Black  Republicans running 










         
Number of state years  490/500   500/500  241/500  340/500  
Analyses include general elections years 1982-2000. All specifications include percent married, percent 
unemployed, percent Black, percent White, and education, age, state and year dummies as well as controls for 
electoral contest on the ballot and incumbents seeking reelection. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state 
level. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE IV 
IMPACT OF BLACK CANDIDATES ON WHITE VOTER TURNOUT AND VOTE CHOICE,  
BY PARTY, NES 
    Voted for the Democratic 
Candidate for… 
  Turnout  House   Senate   Governor 
Total Black Democrats*Republican  .052** 
(.023) 
     
Total Black Democrats*Democrat  .071** 
(.032) 
     
Total Black Democrats*Independent  -.036 
(.025) 
     
         


















Joint significance of above three coefficients, 
P>F 
  .000  .2  .000 
         


















Joint significance of above three coefficients, 
P>F 
  .969  .000  .001 
         
Number of state/year/party cells  990  884  614  344 
Analyses include general elections years 1982-2000. All specifications include Republican and 
Democrat dummies, percent married, percent unemployed, percent Black, percent White, and education, 
age, state and year dummies. Column 1 specification further includes controls for electoral contests on the 
ballot and incumbents seeking reelection. Column 2-4 specifications, estimated only for state/years in 
which a contested election of the type occurred and only for cells in which there are respondents who voted 
on these contests, include dummies for whether the Republican and Democratic candidates are incumbents. 
For House elections the dummy for a Black candidate is replaced with proportion Black candidates in 
contested races; data for individuals voting in contested elections is collapsed to the state level for 
comparability with remaining columns.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. 




EXPLAINING INCREASED WHITE VOTER TURNOUT 
ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS, NES 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Panel A               














               
Panel B               














Attitudes towards Blacks, higher is more positive (mean=62.6/97)  -.003 
(.002) 
           
Conservatism scale, higher is more conservative (mean=4.36/7)    -.006 
(.031) 
         
Party contact (mean=.26)      .102 
(.086) 
       
Any contact (mean =.3)         .114 
(.101) 
     
Watch/hear/read media regarding campaign (mean=.92)           .512*** 
(.179) 
   
Recall either House candidate (mean=.33)            .226*** 
(.066) 
 
Perceived polarization between parties (mean= 2.68/6)              .034* 
(.019) 
               
Number of state years  340/500  336/500  340/500  303/500  219/500  340/500  339/500 
Analyses include general elections years 1982-2000 with the exception of Column 4 (any contact variable not available for 1982) and Column 5 (media 
variable not available for 1988, 1990, 1994 and 1998). All specifications include percent married, percent unemployed, percent Black, percent White, election 
characteristics and education, age, state and year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. ***denotes significance at the percent 
level, ** at the 5 percent level and at the * 10 percent level. 
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TABLE VI 
EXPLAINING INCREASED VOTER TURNOUT 
CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS, CPS 
  Black Turnout    White Turnout 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 




        .031*** 
(.008) 
     
Total Black Democrat incumbents  .044* 
(.026) 
        -.034** 
(.015) 
     
Test of equality of above two 
coefficients, P>F  
.447          .001       




        -.014 
(.014) 
     
Total Black Republican incumbents  .027 
(.105) 
        .037 
(.147) 
     
Test of equality of above two 
coefficients, P>F 
.821          .731       
























Controls:                   
Years of Black representation                   
House  Yes          Yes       
Senate  Yes          Yes       
Governor  Yes          Yes       
Candidate Attributes                   
State level experience      Yes  Yes        Yes  Yes 
House experience        Yes          Yes 
Education        Yes          Yes 
Military service        Yes          Yes 
                   
Number of state years  490/500  344/350  339/350  332/350    500/500  350/350  345/350  338/350 
All specifications include percent married, percent unemployed, percent Black, percent White, election characteristics and education, 
age, state and year dummies. Senate regressions estimated for the years 1988-2000. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state 




































LONGITUDINAL IMPACT OF BLACK DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES ON VOTER TURNOUT, CPS 
Analyses include general elections years 1982-1996. 